

# **REFLECTO**

**Smart Contract Review** 

**Deliverable: Smart Contract Audit Report** 

**Security Report** 

**November 2021** 

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# **Report Summary**

Title	REFLECTO Smart Contract Audit			
Project Owner	REFLECTO			
Туре	Public			
Reviewed by	Vatsal Raychura Revision date 10/11/2021			
Approved by	eNebula Solutions Private Limited  Approval date 10/11/2021		10/11/2021	
		Nº Pages	36	

# **Overview**

# Background

REFLECTO requested that eNebula Solutions perform an Extensive Smart Contract audit of their Smart Contract.

# **Project Dates**

The following is the project schedule for this review and report:

- **November 10**: Smart Contract Review Completed (Completed)
- **November 10**: Delivery of Smart Contract Audit Report (Completed)

#### Review Team

The following eNebula Solutions team member participated in this review:

- Sejal Barad, Security Researcher and Engineer
- Vatsal Raychura, Security Researcher and Engineer

# Coverage

# Target Specification and Revision

For this audit, we performed research, investigation, and review of the smart contract of REFLECTO.

The following documentation repositories were considered in-scope for the review:

• REFLECTO Project: https://bscscan.com/address/0xEA3C823176D2F6feDC682d3cd9C30115448767b3#code

# Introduction

Given the opportunity to review REFLECTO Project's smart contract source code, we in the report outline our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistencies between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts is ready to launch after resolving the mentioned issues, there are no critical or high issues found related to business logic, security or performance.

#### About REFLECTO: -

Item	Description		
Issuer	REFLECTO		
Type	BEP20		
Platform	Solidity		
Audit Method	Whitebox		
Latest Audit Report	November 10, 2021		

#### The Test Method Information: -

Test method	Description
Black box testing	Conduct security tests from an attacker's perspective externally.
Grey box testing	Conduct security testing on code modules through the scripting tool, observing the internal running status, mining weaknesses.
White box testing	Based on the open-source code, non-open-source code, to detect whether there are vulnerabilities in programs such as nodes, SDK, etc.

The vulnerability severity level information:

Level	Description		
Critical	Critical severity vulnerabilities will have a significant effect on the		
	security of the DeFi project, and it is strongly recommended to fix the		
	critical vulnerabilities.		
High	High severity vulnerabilities will affect the normal operation of the DeFi		
	project. It is strongly recommended to fix high-risk vulnerabilities.		
Medium	Medium severity vulnerability will affect the operation of the DeFi		
	project. It is recommended to fix medium-risk vulnerabilities.		
Low	Low severity vulnerabilities may affect the operation of the DeFi project		
	in certain scenarios. It is suggested that the project party should		
	evaluate and consider whether these vulnerabilities need to be fixed.		
Weakness	There are safety risks theoretically, but it is extremely difficult to		
	reproduce in engineering.		

# The Full List of Check Items:

Category	Check Item	
	Constructor Mismatch	
	Ownership Takeover	
	Redundant Fallback Function	
	Overflows & Underflows	
	Reentrancy	
	MONEY-Giving Bug	
Rasic Coding Rugs	Blackhole	
Basic Coding Bugs	Unauthorized Self-Destruct	
	Revert DoS	
	Unchecked External Call	
	Gasless Send	
	Send Instead of Transfer	
	Costly Loop	
	(Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries	
	(Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables	
	Transaction Ordering Dependence	
	Deprecated Uses	
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks	
	Business Logics Review	

	Functionality Checks		
	Authentication Management		
	Access Control & Authorization		
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Oracle Security		
Advanced Deri Sciutiny	Digital Asset Escrow		
	Kill-Switch Mechanism		
	Operation Trails & Event Generation		
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling		
	Frontend-Contract Integration		
	Deployment Consistency		
	Holistic Risk Management		
	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array		
	Using Fixed Compiler Version		
Additional Recommendations	Making Visibility Level Explicit		
	Making Type Inference Explicit		
	Adhering To Function Declaration		
	Strictly		
	Following Other Best Practices		

# Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in This Audit:

Category	Summary	
Configuration	Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software.	
Data Processing Issues	Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data.	
Numeric Errors	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.	
Security Features	Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.)	
Time and State	Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads.	
Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes	Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function.	
Resource Management	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.	

Behavioral Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses.		
Business Logics	Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application.		
Initialization and Cleanup	Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown.		
Arguments and Parameters	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use arguments or parameters within function calls.		
Expression Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code.		
Coding Practices	Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an ex pilotable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.		

# **Findings**

# Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the REFLECTO's Smart Contract. During the first phase of our audit, we studied the smart contract source code and ran our in-house static code analyzer through the Specific tool. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by tool. We further manually review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	No. of Issues
Critical	0
High	0
Medium	0
Low	4
Total	4

We have so far identified that there are potential issues with severity of **0 Critical**, **0 High**, **0 Medium**, **and 4 Low**. Overall, these smart contracts are well- designed and engineered.

# **Functional Overview**

(\$) = payable function	[Pub] public
# = non-constant function	[Ext] external
	[Prv] private
	[Int] internal

- + Reflecto (IBEP20, Auth)
  - [Pub] <Constructor> #
    - modifiers: Auth
  - [Ext] getDistributorFactory
  - [Ext] addDistributor #
    - modifiers: authorized
  - [Ext] deleteDistributor #
    - modifiers: authorized
  - [Ext] getDistributersBEP20Keys
  - [Ext] getDistributer
  - [Ext] getTotalDividends
  - [Pub] version
  - [Ext] getChainID
  - [Ext] <Fallback> (\$)
  - [Ext] donate (\$)
  - [Ext] totalSupply
  - [Ext] decimals
  - [Ext] symbol
  - [Ext] name
  - [Ext] getOwner
  - [Pub] balanceOf
  - [Ext] allowance

- [Pub] approve # - [Ext] approveMax # - [Ext] transfer # - [Ext] transferFrom # - [Int] \_transferFrom # - [Int] \_basicTransfer # - [Int] checkTxLimit
- [Int] shouldTakeFee
- [Pub] getTotalFee
- [Pub] getMultipliedFee
- [Int] takeFee #
- [Int] shouldSwapBack
- [Int] swapBack #
  - modifiers: swapping
- [Int] shouldAutoBuyback
- [Ext] triggerZeusBuyback #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Ext] clearBuybackMultiplier #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Int] triggerAutoBuyback #
- [Int] buyTokens #
  - modifiers: swapping
- [Ext] setAutoBuybackSettings #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Ext] setBuybackMultiplierSettings #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Int] launched
- [Pub] launch #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Ext] setTxLimit #
  - modifiers: authorized

- [Ext] setIsDividendExempt #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Ext] setIsFeeExempt #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Ext] setIsTxLimitExempt #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Ext] setFees #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Ext] setFeeReceivers #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Ext] setSwapBackSettings #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Ext] setTargetLiquidity #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Ext] setDistributionCriteria #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Ext] setDistributorSettings #
  - modifiers: authorized
- [Pub] getCirculatingSupply
- [Pub] getLiquidityBacking
- [Pub] isOverLiquified
- [Int] \_setAllowance #
- [Ext] permit #

# **Detailed Results**

#### **Issues Checking Status**

#### 1. Floating Pragma

- SWC ID:103
- Severity: LowLocation: Reflecto.sol
- Relationships: CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime
- Description: A floating pragma is set. The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.8.0"". It is recommended to specify a fixed compiler version to ensure that the bytecode produced does not vary between builds. This is especially important if you rely on bytecode-level verification of the code.

```
//SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
pragma solidity ^0.8.0;
```

• Remediations: Lock the pragma version and also consider known bugs (https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/releases) for the compiler version that is chosen.

#### 2. State Variable Default Visibility

- SWC ID:108Severity: Low
- Location: Reflecto.sol
- Relationships: CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards
- Description: State variable visibility is not set. It is best practice to set the visibility of state variables explicitly. The default visibility for "BUSD", "Crypter", "DEAD", "ZERO", "DEAD\_NON\_CHECKSUM", "\_totalSupply", "isFeeExempt", "\_balances", "\_allowances", "isTxLimitExempt", "isDividendExempt", "liquidityFee", "buybackFee", "gasWalletFee", "marketingFee", "feeDenominator", "reflectionFee", "totalFee". "targetLiquidity", "targetLiquidityDenominator", "buybackMultiplierNumerator", "buybackMultiplierDenominator", "buybackMultiplierTriggeredAt", "buybackMultiplierLength", "buyBacker", "autoBuybackCap", "autoBuybackAccumulator", "autoBuybackAmount", "autoBuybackBlockPeriod", "autoBuybackBlockLast", "distributor", "distributorGas", "inSwap" are internal. Other possible visibility settings are public and private.

```
25
        uint256 _totalSupply = 1_000_000_000_000_000 * (10**_decimals);
26
27
         uint256 public _maxTxAmount = _totalSupply.div(400); // 0.25%
28
29
         mapping(address => uint256) _balances;
30
         mapping(address => uint256) public nonces;
31
         mapping(address => mapping(address => uint256)) _allowances;
32
33
         mapping(address => bool) isFeeExempt;
34
         mapping(address => bool) isTxLimitExempt;
         mapping(address => bool) isDividendExempt;
35
36
         uint256 liquidityFee = 400;
37
         uint256 buybackFee = 200;
38
         uint256 gasWalletFee = 100;
39
         uint256 reflectionFee = 1000;
40
         uint256 marketingFee = 300;
41
42
         uint256 totalFee = 2000;
43
         uint256 feeDenominator = 10000;
44
          48
          49
                   uint256 targetLiquidity = 25;
          50
                   uint256 targetLiquidityDenominator = 100;
          51
        57
        58
                 uint256 buybackMultiplierNumerator = 200;
        59
                 uint256 buybackMultiplierDenominator = 100;
        60
                 uint256 buybackMultiplierTriggeredAt;
                 uint256 buybackMultiplierLength = 30 minutes;
        61
        62
                 bool public autoBuybackEnabled = false;
        63
        64
                 mapping(address => bool) buyBacker;
        65
                 uint256 autoBuybackCap;
                 uint256 autoBuybackAccumulator;
        66
                 uint256 autoBuybackAmount;
        67
                 uint256 autoBuybackBlockPeriod;
        68
                 uint256 autoBuybackBlockLast;
        69
        70
        71
                 DistributorFactory distributor;
                 // address public distributorAddress:
        72
                 uint256 distributorGas = 500000;
        73
        74
```

```
bool public swapEnabled = true;

uint256 public swapThreshold = _totalSupply / 2000; // 0.005%

bool inSwap;

modifier swapping() {
    inSwap = true;
    _;
    inSwap = false;
}
```

• Remediations: Variables can be specified as being public, internal or private. Explicitly define visibility for all state variables.

#### 3. Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes

- SWC ID:120
- Severity: Low
- Location: Reflecto.sol
- Relationships: CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values
- Description: Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness. The environment variable "block.number" looks like it might be used as a source of randomness. Note that the values of variables like coinbase, gaslimit, block number and timestamp are predictable and can be manipulated by a malicious miner. Also keep in mind that attackers know hashes of earlier blocks. Don't use any of those environment variables as sources of randomness and be aware that use of these variables introduces a certain level of trust into miners.

```
333
              function getTotalFee(bool selling) public view returns (uint256) {
                   if (launchedAt + 1 >= block.number) {
    334
                       return feeDenominator.sub(1);
    335
    336
                   if (selling) {
    337
    338
                       return getMultipliedFee();
    339
    340
                   return totalFee;
              }
    341
 449
           function shouldAutoBuyback() internal view returns (bool) {
 450
                return
 451
                    msg.sender != pair &&
 452
                    !inSwap &&
 453
                    autoBuybackEnabled &&
 454
                    autoBuybackBlockLast + autoBuybackBlockPeriod <= block.number &&
 455
                    address(this).balance >= autoBuybackAmount;
 456
473
          function triggerAutoBuyback() internal {
474
              buyTokens(autoBuybackAmount, DEAD);
              autoBuybackBlockLast = block.number;
475
              autoBuybackAccumulator = autoBuybackAccumulator.add(autoBuybackAmount);
476
              if (autoBuybackAccumulator > autoBuybackCap) {
477
                  autoBuybackEnabled = false;
478
479
480
```

```
492
                function setAutoBuybackSettings(
      493
                    bool _enabled,
                    uint256 _cap,
      494
      495
                    uint256 _amount,
                    uint256 _period
      496
      497
                ) external authorized {
                    autoBuybackEnabled = _enabled;
      498
      499
                    autoBuybackCap = _cap;
      500
                    autoBuybackAccumulator = 0;
      501
                    autoBuybackAmount = amount;
      502
                    autoBuybackBlockPeriod = _period;
                    autoBuybackBlockLast = block.number;
      503
      504
                }
521
          function launch() public authorized {
              require(launchedAt == 0, "Already launched boi");
522
523
              launchedAt = block.number;
524
              launchedAtTimestamp = block.timestamp;
525
          }
```

#### Remediations:

- Using commitment scheme, e.g. RANDAO.
- Using external sources of randomness via oracles, e.g. Oraclize. Note that this approach requires trusting in oracle, thus it may be reasonable to use multiple oracles.
- Using Bitcoin block hashes, as they are more expensive to mine.

# 4. Missing zero address validation

• Severity: Low

• Location: Reflecto.sol

• Description: Detect missing zero address validation.

• Remediations: Check that the address is not zero.

#### **Automated Tools Results**

Slither: -

```
trancy in Reflecto.constructor(address,address) (Reflecto.sol#98-127):
 Reflecto.addDistributor(address,address,address) (Reflecto.sola137-143) ignores return value by distributor.addDistributor(_dexRouter,_BEP_TOKEN,_WBRB
 ) (Reflecto.sol#142)
Reflecto.sol#142)
Reflecto.sol#142)
Reflecto.sol#142)
Reflecto.sol#142)
Reflecto.sol#142)
Reflecto.sol#142)
Reflecto.sol#142)
Reflecto.sol#142)
Reflecto.sol#142)
Reflecto.sol#144)
Reflecto.sol#144)
Reflecto.sol#146)
 Reflects_setAllowance(address,address,uint256).owner (Reflects.sol#647) shadows:
- Auth.owner (Auth.sol#5) (state variable)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
```

```
tvidendDistributor.setDistributionCr(terle(uint256.uint256) (DividendDistributor.sol#67-73) should emit an event for
  DividendDistributor.constructor(address,address,address)._wbeb (DividendDistributor.sol#57) lacks a zero-check on :
|MRMB = wbeb (DividendDistributor.sol#64)
| Auth.transferDwnership(address).adr (Auth.sol#80) lacks a zero-check on :
| conser = adr (Auth.sol#81)
 | compr = odf (Auth.solva) | deflecto.solva) | deflecto.solva) | decks a zero-check on :
| HeRM = _WEMBinpot (Reflecto.solva) | decks a zero-check on :
| HERM = _WEMBinpot (Reflecto.solva) | decks a zero-check on :
| HERM = _WEMBinpot (Reflecto.solva) | decks a zero-check on :
| autoliquidityRecelvers, address, address, address) | decks a zero-check on :
| autoliquidityRecelver = _autoliquidityRecelver (Reflecto.solva) |
| Heflecto.setFeeRecelvers(address, address) | decks a zero-check on :
| rerketingFeeRecelver = _narketingFeeRecelver (Reflecto.solva) |
| Heflecto.setFeeRecelvers(address, address, address) | decks a zero-check on :
| gasWalletFeeRecelver = _gasWalletRecelver (Reflecto.solva) | decks a zero-check on :
| gasWalletFeeRecelver = _gasWalletRecelver (Reflecto.solva) |
| Heflecto.setFeeRecelver = _gasWalletRecelver (Reflecto.solva) |
| Herman | decks | d
  DistributorFactory.addDistributor(address,address, oddress) (DistributorFactory.sol#31-79) has external calls inside a loop: shareholderAddress = distributorFactory.sol#36-64)
DistributorFactory.addDistributor(address,address,address) (DistributorFactory.sol#31-79) has external calls inside a loop: shareholderAndount = distributorFactory.sol#36-64)
DistributorFactory.addDistributor(address,address,address) (DistributorFactory.sol#31-79) has external calls inside a loop: shareholderAndount = distributorFactory.sol#36-72)
DistributorFactory.addDistributor(address,address,address) (DistributorFactory.sol#31-79) has external calls inside a loop: distributor.setShare(shareholderAndount) (DistributorFactory.sol#324-131) has external calls inside a loop: distributorMapping[distributorAndount) (DistributorFactory.sol#324-131) has external calls inside a loop: distributorMapping[distributorAndount) (DistributorFactory.sol#321-7-129)
DistributorFactory.process(wint250) (DistributorFactory.sol#331-340) has external calls inside a loop: distributorMapping[distributorAndress.process(wint250) (DistributorFactory.sol#331-340) has external calls inside a loop: distributorMapping[distributorAndress.process(sol) (DistributorFactory.sol#331-340)
DistributorAddress.process(sol) (DistributorFactory.sol#331-330)
DistributorFactory.deposit() (DistributorFactory.sol#347-349)
DistributorAddress.process(sol) (DistributorFactory.sol#347-349)
DistributorAddress.process(sol) (DistributorFactory.sol#347-349)
DistributorAddress.process(sol) (DistributorFactory.sol#347-349)
DistributorFactory.deposit() (DistributorFactory.sol#347-349)
DistributorFactory.deposit() (DistributorFactory.sol#347-349)
DistributorFactory.deposit() (DistributorFactory.sol#347-349)
DistributorFactory.deposit() (DistributorFactory.sol#347-349)
DistributorFactory.deposit() (DistributorFactory.sol#347-349)
     router.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: msg.value)(0.path.address(this).block.timestamp) (DividendDistributor.sol#1
                                         dividendsPerShare = dividendsPerShare,add(dividendsPerShareAccuracyFactor.mul(amount).div(totalShares)) (bividendbistributor.sol#111-113)
totalDividends = totalDividenda.add(amount) (DividendDistributor.sol#110)
```

```
in DividendDistributor.distributeDividend(address) (DividendDistributor.sol#154-172):
       External calls:

External calls:

BEP_TOKEN, transfer (shareholder, amoont) (DividendDistributor, sol#163)
State variables written after the call(s):

shareholder(lains|shareholder| = block.timestamp (DividendDistributor.sol#164)
strancy in blvidendDistributor.setShare(address, wint256) (DividendDistributor.sol#75-96):
ccy in Reflecto.triggerAutoBuyback() (Reflecto.snl#473-480):
External calls:
- buyTokens(autoBuybackAmount,DEAD) (Reflecto.sol#474)
- router.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeednTransferTokens(value: amount)(8,path,to,block.timestamp) (Reflecto.sol#487-489)
State variables written after the call(s):
- autoBuybackAccumulator = autoBuybackAccumulator.add(autoBuybackAmount) (Reflecto.sol#476)
- autoBuybackBockLast = block.mumber (Reflecto.sol#475)
- autoBuybackEmabled = false (Reflecto.sol#478)
 meentrancy in Reflecto.triogerZeusBuyback(uint256,bool) (Reflecto.sol#458-467):
                   buyTokens(amount_DEAD) (Reflecto_sol#462)
- router.swapEsactEINForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransFerTokens[value: amount](0,path,to,block.timestamp) (Reflecto.sol#487-489)
State variables written after the call(s):
- buybackMultiplierTriggeredAt = block.timestamp (Reflecto.sol#464)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Oucumentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
 leentrancy in Reflecto._transferfrom(address,address,uint256) (Meflecto.sol#262-100):
    External calls:
                    sternal calls:
swapback() (Reflecto.sol#274)
                                     router.swapEnactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(anountToSwap.0.path.address(this),block.timestamp) (Reflecto.sol#485-411)
distributor.deposit(Value: amountBNBElqu(dity)( (Reflecto.sol#432)
router.addLlqu(dityETH(value: amountBNBLlqu(dity)(address(this),amountToLlquify,6,0,autoLlquidityEmeceiver,block.timestamp) (Reflecto
                    triggerAutoSuyback() (Reflecto.sol#277)
                   router:swapikactETHForTokensSupportingFeeDnTransferTokens(value: amount)(8,path,to,block.timestamp) (Reflecto.sol#487-489) distributor.sethere(sender_balances[sender]) (Reflecto.sol#294) distributor.sethere(rectplent, balances[rectplent]) (Reflecto.sol#297-299) distributor.process(distributorGas) (Reflecto.sol#302)
               distributor, process[attributor.uns], precessives.

External calis sending eth:
- swapBack() (Reflecto.sot#274)
- distributor.deposit[value: amountBNBReflection]() (Reflecto.sot#432)
- address(marketing)feemecetver).transfer(amountBNBRarketing) (Reflecto.sot#433)
- address(gasMalletfeeRecetver).transfer(amountBNBCasWaltat) (Reflecto.sot#434)
- router.addLiquidityETH(value: amountBNBLiquidity)(address(this),amountToLiquify,0.0,autoLiquidityReceiver,block.tlmestamp) (Reflecto
   - router.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: amount)(0,path,to,block.timestamp) (Reflects.sol#487-489)
Event entited after the calify:
- Transfer(sender.recipient,amountReceived) (Reflects.sol#384)
**entrancy to Reflects._transferFrom(address_address_uintiss) (Reflects.sol#262-366):
External calist
                   triggerAutoBuyback() (Neflecta.sol#277)
- rowter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(value: amount)(0,path,to,block.tinestamp) (Reflecta.sol#487-489)
External calls sending ath:
- swapExack() (Peflecta.sol#274)
- distributor.deposit(value: amountBNBReflection)() (Reflecta.sol#482)
                                      address(marketingFeeRecelver).transfer(amountBMBnarketing) (Neflecte.sol#433)
address(gasMalletFeeRecelver).transfer(amountBMBGasMallet) (Meflecto.sol#434)
router.addi.quidityETH[value: amountBMBEiquidity](address(this),amountFoilquity,8,8,autoliquidityRmcelver,block.timestamp) (Meflecto
               - router.smapfmact()HertakensSupportingFeednTransFerTokens(value: anount)(0,path,to,block.tlmestamp) (Reflecto.sol#457-489)
Event entited after the call(s):
- TransFer(sender,address(this),FeeAnount) (Reflecto.sol#375)
- amountReceived = takeFee(sender,recipient,amount) (Reflecto.sol#287-289)
- amountMecelved = takeFec(sender_rectplent_amount) (Reflects.sol#287-289)

Reentrancy in Reflecto.constructor(address_address) (Reflecto.sol#90-127):

External calls:

- palr = IDEX/actory(router.factory()).createPair(wBhB_address(this)) (Reflecto.sol#94)

Event entitled after the call(s):

- Approval(mag.sender, Apender_amount) (Reflecto.sol#233)

- approval(mag.sender, Apender_amount) (Reflecto.sol#233)

- approval(mag.sender, spender, amount) (Reflecto.sol#233)

- sporave(address(pair), totalSupply) (Reflecto.sol#100)

- Transfer(address(B),mag.sender, totalSupply) (Reflecto.sol#106)

Reentrancy in Reflecto.swapBack() (Reflecto.sol#388-447):
External calls:
                   router.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(amountToSwap,0.path.address(this),block.timestamp) (Paflecto.sol##85-411) distributor.deposit(value: amountEMBReflection)() (Reflecto.sol##32) router.addi.iquidityETH(value: amountEMBi.iquidity)(address(this),amountToLiquify.8.0.auto.iquidity@ecwiver.block.timestamp) (Reflecto.sol##37
               External calls sanding ath:
- distributor.deposit[value: amountBMBHeflection]() {Reflecto.sol#432}
- address(marketingFeeRecetver).transfer(amountBMBHerketing) (Meflecto.sol#433)
- address(gasWalletFeeRecetver).transfer(amountBMBGasWallet) (Reflecto.sol#434)
- router.additqutdityETH(value: amountBMBLiquidity)(address(this),amountToliquify,0,0,autoliquidityReceiver,block.timestamp) (Reflecto.sol#437)
 Event emitted after the call(s):
- AutoLiquify(amountBHBLlquidity,amountToLlquify) (Reflecto.sol#445)
eentrancy in Reflecto.triggerZeusBuyback(uint256,bool) (Reflecto.sol#458-467):
                External calls:
                   buyTokens(amount,BEAD) (Reflects.sol#462)
- router.swapExactETHForTokensSupportIngFeeDoTransferTokens(value: amount)(8.path.to.block.timestamp) (Reflects.sol#487-489)
                Event emitted after the call(s):
- BuybackMultiplierActive(buybackMultiplierLength) (Reflecto.sol#465)
```

```
tvidendDistributor.shooldDistribute(address) (DividendDistributor.sol#144-152) uses timestamp for comparisons
                                         Dangerous comparisons:
- shareholderClaims[shareholder] + minPeriod < block.timestamp && getUngaldEarnings(shareholder) > minDistribution (DividendDistributor.sol#24
      leflecto.getMultipliedFee() (Reflecto.sol#343-363) uses timestamp for comparisons
   Mangerous comparisons:

- launchedAtTImestamp + 88+800 > block.timestamp (Reflecto.spl#344)
- buybackMultiplierTriggeredAt.add(buybackMultiplierLength) > block.timestamp (Reflecto.spl#347-348)

Reflecto.shouldSwapBack() (Reflecto.spl#380-386) uses timestamp for comparisons
- bungerous comparisons:
- nsg.sender |= pair &B | inSwap &8 swapEnabled &8 balances[address(this)) >= swapThreshold (Reflecto.spl#381-385)

Reflecto.isoveriquifted(unit256,unit256) (Reflecto.spl#633-830) uses timestamp for comparisons
- swapthreshold(thispackungarous > farmet (Reflecto.spl#638)
   uangerous comparisons:

- gettiquidityBacking(accuracy) > target (Meflecto.sol#638)

Meflecto.permit(eddress,address,uint256,uint256,buol,uint8,bytes32) (Reflecto.sol#638-697) uses timestamp for comparisons
- pangerous comparisons:
- require(bool, string)(emplry == 8 ]| block.timestamp <= exp(ry,Meflecto/permit-expired) (Reflecto.sol#698-693)

Meflecto: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
  DividendDistributor.process(wint25a) (DividendDistributor.sol#11a-142) has costly operations inside a loop:
- currentIndex = 0 (DividendDistributor.sol#13a)
DividendDistributor.process(wint25a) (DividendDistributor.sol#11a-142) has costly operations inside a loop:
- currentIndex ++ (DividendDistributor.sol#11a-142) has costly operations inside a loop:
- surrentIndex ++ (DividendDistributor.sol#13a)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#costly-operations-inside-a-loop
  Reflecto.launched() (Reflecto.sol#517-519) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.elv(ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#200-109) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.nod(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#85-87) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.nod(ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#811-120) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.tryMod(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#47-56) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.tryMod(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#31-51 is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.tryMod(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#31-45) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.tryMod(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#31-45) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.trySub(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#20-29) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.trySub(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#20-29) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.trySub(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#20-29) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.trySub(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#20-29) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.trySub(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#20-29) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.trySub(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#20-29) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.trySub(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#20-29) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.tryMod(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#20-29) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.tryMod(ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#20-29) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.tryMod(ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#20-29) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.tryMod(ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256) (Safemath.sol#20-29) is never used and should be removed 
Safemath.tryMod(ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt256,ulnt25
    Meflecto, maxTxAmount (Reflecto.sol#27) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable;

    __totalSupply.d(v(400)
    leflecto.swapThreshold (Reflecto.sol#82) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable;

    totalSupply / 2000
Teference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation@function-initializing-state
  Reference: https://guthub.com/cryttc/sither/wiki/Detector-Documentationefunction-initializing-state
Pragna version*08.80 (Auth.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.0
Pragna version*08.80 (distributorFactory.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.0
Pragna version*08.80 (distributor sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.0
Pragna version*08.80 (IDEX.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.0
Pragna version*08.80 (IDEX.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.0
Pragna version*08.80 (IDEX.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.0
Pragna version*08.80 (Sefecto.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.0
Pragna version*08.80 (Sefecto.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.0
Pragna version*08.80 (Sefecto.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.0
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Pragna version*08.80 (Sefecto.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.0
Reference: https://github.com/crytte/sitter/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Struct OtatributorFactory atmostdistributors (DistributorFactory.sol#2.17) is not in Caphords

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor (address, address, address)_router (DistributorFactory.sol#3) is not in mixedCase

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor (address, address, address)_submib (OtatributorFactory.sol#3) is not in mixedCase

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor (address, address, address)_submib (OtatributorFactory.sol#3) is not in mixedCase

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor(address, address)_submib (OtatributorFactory.sol#3) is not in mixedCase

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor(address, address)_submib (OtatributorFactory.sol#3) is not in mixedCase

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor(address, address)_submib (OtatributorFactory.sol#3) is not in mixedCase

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor(address, address)_submib (OtatributorFactory.sol#3) is not in mixedCase

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor(address, address)_submib (OtatributorFactory.sol#3) is not in mixedCase

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor(address, win250, win250, win250)_submib (OtatributorFactory.sol#30) is not in mixedCase

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor(address, win250, win250, win3250, win3250, win3250) is not in mixedCase

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor(address, win250, win250, win3250, win3250, win3250) is not in mixedCase

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor(address, win3250, win3250, win3250, win3250, win3250) is not in mixedCase

Parameter DistributorFactory additatributor(address, win3250, 
       eference: https://glthub.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
```

```
Parameter Reflecto.setFeeReceivers(address,address)_autoliquidityReceiver (Reflecto.sol#579) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reflecto.setFeeReceivers(address,address,address)_marketIngfeeReceiver (Reflecto.sol#580) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reflecto.setFeeReceivers(address,address,address)_gasMalletReceiver (Reflecto.sol#581) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reflecto.setSwapHackSettings(bool_uint250)_amount (Reflecto.sol#580) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reflecto.setSwapHackSettings(bool_uint250)_target (Reflecto.sol#580) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reflecto.setFargetLiquidity(uint250_uint250)_target (Reflecto.sol#580) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reflecto.setFargetLiquidity(uint250_uint250)_target (Reflecto.sol#590) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reflecto.setDistributionCriteria(address.uint250_uint250)_minPeriod (Reflecto.sol#800) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reflecto.setDistributionCriteria(address.uint250_uint250)_minPeriod (Reflecto.sol#800) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reflecto.setDistributionCriteria(address.uint250_uint250)_minPeriod (Reflecto.sol#800) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reflecto.setDistributionCriteria(address.uint250_uint250)_minDistribution (Reflecto.sol#807) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reflecto.setDistributionCriteria(address.uint250_uint250)_minDistribution (Reflecto.sol#807) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Reflecto.setDistributionCriteria(address,uint256).minbistribution (Reflecto.sel#897) is not in ni
Variable Reflecto.SUSD (Reflecto.sel#15) is not in mixedCase
Variable Reflecto.SUSD (Reflecto.sel#15) is not in mixedCase
Variable Reflecto.MRNN (Reflecto.sel#17) is not in mixedCase
Variable Reflecto.DEAD (Reflecto.sel#19) is not in mixedCase
Constant Reflecto.DEAD (Reflecto.sel#21) is not in UPPER CASE MITH UNDERSCORES
Constant Reflecto.sel#10 (Reflecto.sel#21) is not in UPPER CASE MITH UNDERSCORES
Constant Reflecto.dectmals (Reflecto.sel#21) is not in UPPER CASE MITH UNDERSCORES
Constant Reflecto.Dealmore (Reflecto.sel#21) is not in mixedCase
Variable Reflecto.Dealmore (Reflecto.sel#21) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentationalconformance-to-selidity-naming-conventions
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentations
External calls sending eth:
- swapBack() (Reflecto.sel#274)
- distributor.deposit(value: anountBNBReflection)() (Reflecto.sel#432)
- address(anarketingfed#sectiver).transfer(anountBNBRarketing) (Buflecto.sel#433)
- address(gasHalletFed#sectiver).transfer(anountBNBGasHallet) (Reflecto.sel#434)
- router.add.tquidityETH(value: anountBNBCasHallet)(Address(this),anountGliquify,0,0,autoLiquidityReceiver,block.timestamp) (Reflecto
                        amountReceived = takeFee(sender,rectpinnt) (Reflecto.sel#287-289)

- Transfer(sender,rectpinnt,amountReceived) (Reflecto.sel#287-289)

ieentrancy in Reflecto.swapBack() (Reflecto.sel#388-447):
                          Event emitted after the call(s):
- Autoliquify(amountNNBLiquidity,amountToLiquify) (Reflecto.sol#445)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikl/Defector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-4
```

```
wartable TREARDATE, additionally (address, address, wint250, wint250, address, wint226), address, wint250, address, wint250, address.

autor_addit_addity(address, address_wint250, wint250, address_wint250, address.

address_wint250, address_wint250, wint250, address_wint250, address_wint250, address.

address_wint250, address_w
```

#### MythX: -

ne	SMC Title	Severity	Short Description
2	(SWC-193) Floating Pragna	Low	A floating pragma is set.
15	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
16	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
18	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
19	(SWC-100) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
20	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
26:	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
26	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
26	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "**" discovered
29	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
31	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
33	(SWC-100) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
34	(SWC-10B) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
35	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
37	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
3-8	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
19	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
60	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
61	(SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.


-43	(Sur. 188) State Variable Default Middlifts	1 m	State vertable visibility is not set
49	(SHC-100) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
-	(SWC-188) State Variable Default Visibility	TIME THAT	State variable visibility is not set.
58	(SMC-100) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
58	(SMC-188) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
59	(SMC-188) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
56	(SMC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
61	(SMC-188) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
64	(SMC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
65	(SMC-188) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
56	(SMC-188) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
67	(SMC-188) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
68	(SMC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
59	(SMC-188) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
71	(SMC-108) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
73	(SWC-188) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
82	(SMC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
83	(SMC-188) State Variable Default Visibility	Low	State variable visibility is not set.
334	(SHC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
334	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randonness from Chain Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomnness.
344	(SWC-101) Integer OverFlow and UnderFlow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
482	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
403	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
454	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
454	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randonness from Chalm Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randommness.
475	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomnness.
484	(SWC-118) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
485	(SWC-118) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
503	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chalm Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomnness.
511	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
523	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness From Chalm Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randonmness.
528	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation */* discovered
575	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
694	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered


# Mythril: -


root@sv-VirtualBox:/home/sv/Reflecto# myth analyze Reflecto.sol The analysis was completed successfully. No issues were detected.

#### Solhint: -

```
Linter results:
  Reflecto.sol:11:1: Error: Contract has 47 states declarations but allowed no more than 15
  Reflecto.sol:15:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state
  Reflecto_sol:15:13: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Reflecto.sol:16:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state
  Reflecto.sol:16:13: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Reflecto.sol:17:20: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Reflecto.sol:18:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state
  Reflecto.sol:18:13: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Reflecto.sol:19:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state
  Reflecto.sol:20:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state
  Reflecto.sol:20:13: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase
  Reflecto.sol:22:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state
  Reflecto.sol:23:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility of state
```









#### **Basic Coding Bugs**

#### 1. Constructor Mismatch

 Description: Whether the contract name and its constructor are not identical to each other.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

#### 2. Ownership Takeover

o Description: Whether the set owner function is not protected.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

#### 3. Redundant Fallback Function

o Description: Whether the contract has a redundant fallback function.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

#### 4. Overflows & Underflows

 Description: Whether the contract has general overflow or underflow vulnerabilities

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

### 5. Reentrancy

 Description: Reentrancy is an issue when code can call back into your contract and change state, such as withdrawing ETHs.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

#### 6. MONEY-Giving Bug

 Description: Whether the contract returns funds to an arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

#### 7. Blackhole

 Description: Whether the contract locks ETH indefinitely: merely in without out.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: High

#### 8. Unauthorized Self-Destruct

 Description: Whether the contract can be killed by any arbitrary address.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 9. Revert DoS

 Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to DoS attack because of unexpected revert.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 10. Unchecked External Call

o Description: Whether the contract has any external call without checking the return value.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 11. Gasless Send

 $\circ \quad \text{Description: Whether the contract is vulnerable to gasless send.}$ 

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 12. Send Instead of Transfer

 $\circ\quad \text{Description: Whether the contract uses send instead of transfer.}$ 

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 13. Costly Loop

 Description: Whether the contract has any costly loop which may lead to Out-Of-Gas exception.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 14. (Unsafe) Use of Untrusted Libraries

o Description: Whether the contract use any suspicious libraries.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 15. (Unsafe) Use of Predictable Variables

 Description: Whether the contract contains any randomness variable, but its value can be predicated.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 16. Transaction Ordering Dependence

 Description: Whether the final state of the contract depends on the order of the transactions.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### 17. Deprecated Uses

 Description: Whether the contract use the deprecated tx.origin to perform the authorization.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Medium

#### **Semantic Consistency Checks**

 Description: Whether the semantic of the white paper is different from the implementation of the contract.

Result: PASSEDSeverity: Critical

# Conclusion

In this audit, we thoroughly analyzed REFLECTO's Smart Contract. The current code base is well organized but there are promptly some Low-level issues found in the first phase of Smart Contract Audit.

Meanwhile, we need to emphasize that smart contracts as a whole are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.

# **About eNebula Solutions**

We believe that people have a fundamental need to security and that the use of secure solutions enables every person to more freely use the Internet and every other connected technology. We aim to provide security consulting service to help others make their solutions more resistant to unauthorized access to data & inadvertent manipulation of the system. We support teams from the design phase through the production to launch and surely after.

The eNebula Solutions team has skills for reviewing code in C, C++, Python, Haskell, Rust, Node.js, Solidity, Go, and JavaScript for common security vulnerabilities & specific attack vectors. The team has reviewed implementations of cryptographic protocols and distributed system architecture, including in cryptocurrency, blockchains, payments, and smart contracts. Additionally, the team can utilize various tools to scan code & networks and build custom tools as necessary.

Although we are a small team, we surely believe that we can have a momentous impact on the world by being translucent and open about the work we do.

For more information about our security consulting, please mail us at - contact@enebula.in